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Abstract 
Recently there has been a burgeoning empirical literature analysing how culture 
affects economic development. This field of research is currently developing 
further at the border between growth theory and institutional economics. This 
paper summarizes, and gives a detailed criticism of, this literature. Following the 
two major routes suggested by the critiques, the author proposes a possible path 
for further progress in the field. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although Adam Smith (1759) was the first to analyse how norms, 
beliefs, morality and culture affect economic development, an upsurge of interest 
in the role of culture has occurred only recently. Probably the most prominent 
contribution to the field which is not recent – besides Adam Smith’s book –, is 
the influential work by Max Weber (1930). Weber used religiosity to express 
culture and argued that Protestantism played a crucial role in the development of 
capitalism. Following this line of research, nowadays some studies, such as 
Landes (2000), Sen (2002), Boettke (2001), or Greif (1994) argue that differences 
                                                 
1 This paper has been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office of 
Hungary (project number: K 120686). 
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in culture matter for long-run development.2 However, this theoretical-historical 
approach to the effects of culture on development is quite weak; the dominant 
branch is empirically oriented. 
The quantitative analyses on the impact of culture have been made 
possible by the emergence of cross-cultural datasets such as (1) the World Values 
Survey (WVS) (Inglehart 1997), (2) the Hofstede dataset (Hofstede 1980, 2001); 
(3) the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) (Schwartz 1994, 2006), and (4) the Global 
Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Program 
(GLOBE) dataset (House et al. 2014). The aim of this paper is to summarize, and 
give a detailed criticism of, the empirical literature dealing with relationship 
between culture and growth3, and, on this basis, to propose a possible path for 
further progress in the field. 
Up to the present time an extensive literature has developed which is 
diverse in terms of the measure of culture used in the analyses undertaken, their 
empirical strategies, and the samples of countries or regions they use. Due to this 
diversity, it is not easy to find a categorization criterion. What seems to be clear 
at first glance is that there is a line within this literature focusing on social capital 
(trust). Besides this, we will divide the literature into early and recent 
investigations, because these differ at least in one important respect: recent 
studies apply much more sophisticated econometrics. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we will summarize the 
early literature, in section 3 the literature focusing on the growth-effect of social 
capital (trust), and in section 4 we will review the recently published literature. 
The next section will provide a structured criticism of the empirical literature on 
the impact of culture on economic growth. In section 6, based on this criticism, 
we will propose a possible path for further progress in the field. 
 
2. THE EARLY LITERATURE 
The number of papers using religiosity as a proxy for culture is relatively 
limited. One of the most influential papers is Barro and McCleary (2003), which 
examines the impact of church attendance and religious beliefs on economic 
growth. In their panel regression they use World Values Survey (WVS) data as 
well as two other reports on religion. They find that economic growth is 
positively related to the extent of religious beliefs, notably a belief in heaven and 
hell, but negatively to church attendance. To deal with the potential problem of 
                                                 
2 “If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes almost all 
the difference. (Here Max Weber was right on.)” (Landes 2000:2). 
3 Accordingly, we will not review those empirical studies in which the dependent variable in the 
empirical analysis is a variable different from a measure of economic performance. In this paper 
growth is understood in broad terms, since different authors use different measures in their empirical 
investigations: “Economic growth occurs whenever people take resources and rearrange them in ways 
that make them more valuable” (Romer 2008). 
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endogeneity, they also use an instrumental variables framework. McClearly and 
Barro (2006) basically reaffirm the same results; the only difference is that here 
the empirical strategy is a cross-country design. 
Probably the most important early investigation is found in Hofstede 
(1980). The hypothesis behind the empirical analysis is that cultural differences 
may be the primary source for growth differences across countries. Here the 
dependent variable is the growth rates between 1960 and 1970, and the sample 
includes only high-income countries. Basically, the hypotheses are given 
empirical evidence: individualism is negatively, while uncertainty avoidance is 
positively associated with economic growth. 
In Franke et al. (1991), the authors widen the above analysis in such a 
way that, in addition to Hofstede’s cultural values, they include measures from 
the Chinese Values Survey (Hofstede and Bond 1988), as well. At the end of the 
day, the regression contains four Western and four Chinese values. On a sample 
of only 18 countries they regress these cultural variables on lagged growth rates 
for two periods, 1965-1980 and 1980-1987. The results indicate that more than 
half of the variance in growth rates can be explained by differences in cultural 
variables. 
A line of the empirical literature on the effects of culture on growth has 
been developing within political science, relying to a large extent on Putnam 
(1993) and Inglehart (1990). While this literature, in general terms, also builds its 
empirical analyses on various economic theories, it suffers from certain 
shortcomings in econometrics. The best example of this type of paper is Jackman 
and Miller (1996). Here the concern is about the impact of the political culture on 
various macroeconomic measures. In order to proxy political culture the authors 
take Inglehart's (1990) six measures based on survey data. The empirical 
investigations explore the idea that the relationship between political culture and 
growth is very weak, if not inexistent, a conclusion that challenges Inglehart's 
(1990) findings. 
One bias in Jackman and Miller (1996) may be that the sample consists 
only of the most advanced countries, and another that the model used in the 
empirical investigation is a reduced form version of the growth model; 
accordingly, the possibility that adequate control variables have been omitted 
cannot be ruled out (Swank 1996). From the viewpoint of model specification, 
Granato et al. (1996) can be considered an important improvement on Jackman 
and Miller (1996), leading to quite different results. Granato et al. (1996) 
constructs two measures of culture, namely, achievement motivation and post-
materialist values (based on data from WVS), and includes them in a baseline 
endogenous growth model. The major finding is that both variables are 
significant predictors of economic growth, together with the traditional economic 
factors. 
Edwards and Patterson (2009) extend the analysis of Granato et al. 
(1996) in several ways. First, they repeat the estimation of the same growth 
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regression for different periods of time and samples of countries. Their results 
cannot confirm those of Granato et al. (1996). Their possible answer to this 
inconsistent impact of culture across time and samples is that the essential 
meaning of culture has changed. Second, Edwards and Patterson (2009) deal with 
the problem of the possible endogeneity of culture, which was not the case in 
Granato et al. (2009). After instrumenting achievement motivation and post-
materialism they find that achievement motivation is a significant explanator for 
long-term growth rates, but the other cultural variable is not. In sum, their results 
show that the links between culture and growth are not as clear as was found by 
Granato et al. (1996). 
Besides the above paper, Swank (1996) is another study to highlight and 
refine the results of Granato et al. (1996). This theory-driven empirical analysis 
includes two new variables to express political culture, namely Confucian statist 
and social corporatist sytems. Both are expected to matter for economic growth 
via two mechanisms. First of all, rent-seeking and free-riding behavior may be 
reduced in corporatist states, and in the case of the Confucian statist polities, there 
may be a direct pay-off related to industrial policies. Secondly, these two 
communitarian policies, through the promotion of consensus and concertation, 
may tend to produce political stability, which, in its turn, promotes economic 
growth. To test these hypotheses, Swank (1996) uses the growth model of 
Granato et al. (1996). First, he replicates their results for the sake of comparison, 
then he includes a dichotomous variable for Confucian statist and social 
corporatist sytems. The communitarian polities model, in which he does not 
include Granato et al.'s (1996) two variables, proves to be superior on statistical 
grounds to that of Granato et al. (1996). The major finding, namely that the two 
communitarian polities have a positive significant impact on growth is robust to 
the variations in the sample composition. 
 
3. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL (TRUST)-GROWTH 
LITERATURE  
While early studies developed mainly outside economics, “the opening 
through which culture entered the economic discourse was the concept of trust” 
(Guiso et al 2006:29). In this literature trust is seen as a proxy for culture. The 
trust4-growth literature started with Putnam et al. (1993) which is the first study to 
investigate the economic effect of social capital, which “has opened a Pandora’s 
box of research” (Casey 2004:96) where trust is seen as the most important 
dimension of social capital5 (e.g., Fukuyama 1995). In their book Putnam et al. 
(1993) analyse Italian regions and argue that the critical factor in explaining 
                                                 
4 Interpersonal trust is associated with the confidence that a partner will not exploit the vulnerabilities 
of the other, that is, she will not behave in an opportunistic way. This is the meaning of trust as 
“generalized morality” (Tabellini 2008). 
5 Putnam et al. (1993:167) defines social capital as those “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions”. 
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differences in the economic performance of various Italian regions can be found 
in regional differences in social structure. The study finds that in regions with a 
horizontal social structure, based on trust and shared values, social capital is 
higher, and economic outcomes are greater. 
This work has been followed up by numerous analyses6, of which Knack 
and Keefer (1997) is the most influential. Inspired by Putnam et al. (1993) the 
two scholars associate social capital with interpersonal trust and civic co-
operation. To measure them, they take data from the WVS.7 Knack and Keefer 
(1997) investigates the effect of social capital on economic performance in a 
cross-country regression on a sample of 29 developed countries. First of all, they 
find that both cultural variables significantly affect economic growth8, but more 
importantly, when including an interaction term of trust and GDP per capita in 
the regression besides trust and civic cooperation, they arrive at some very 
interesting results which are in line with certain related economic theories. More 
specifically, they provide evidence that both trust and civic cooperation are 
stronger in countries with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that 
restrain the predatory actions of chief executives, and with better-educated and 
ethnically homogeneous populations. Their results are robust to the use of 
alternative control variables. As another line of robustness checks, Knack and 
Keefer (1997) regresses trust on output per worker, physical and human capital 
per worker and total factor productivity. Trust is found to be significantly 
correlated with all these variables except for total factor productivity. 
An advantage of the paper by Knack and Keefer (1997) is that it tries to 
explore the channel through which trust can affect economic growth. Due to 
various data constraints, the authors can only consider two possible channels: the 
impact of trust on the strength of property and contractual rights, and the impact 
of trust on the performance of the government. The results provide evidence that 
trust may improve the efficiency of the government and contract enforceability. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) is an important paper in the field, providing strong 
empirical evidence for the direct and indirect effects of trust on growth. 
Zak and Knack (2001), in some respects, is an extension of Knack and 
Keefer (1997), by confirming its main findings, but at the same time, providing 
new insights, as well. The hypotheses Zak and Knack (2001) tests are derived 
from a theoretical model regarding trust. This is a model with investors and 
                                                 
6 Another work involving Putnam, namely Helliwell and Putnam (1995) is a further contribution to the 
follow-up literature. The authors find the same positive relationship between social capital and 
economic growth in the regions of Italy, but here they do not include generalized trust in their measure 
of social capital. 
7 The question used in the WVS to assess the level of trust is: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful with dealing with people?” Trust is 
measured as the percentage of respondents in each country that replied "most people can be trusted". 
To measure civic cooperation, they use several questions such as whether the individual feels justified 
in keeping money that he or she has found, or evades taxes if he or she has the chance. 
8 According to the results, a 10 percentage point increase in trust is associated with an increase in 
growth of four-fifths of a percentage point (Knack and Keefer (1997:1260). 
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brokers, in which the investors are subject to moral hazard by the brokers. After 
formulating testable hypotheses from the model, Zak and Knack (2001) run cross-
country growth regressions on a sample of 42 countries to test them. As in Knack 
and Keefer (1997), this paper measures trust with data from the WVS (answers to 
the same question). The results suggest that a one standard deviation (15 
percentage points) increase in trust will lead to 1 percentage point increase in 
growth rates (Knack and Zak 2001:307). To control for the possible endogeneity 
of trust in the growth regression the authors run 2SLS regressions, using the 
Catholic, Muslim and Christian Orthodox share of the population as instruments. 
Here the results are robust to the choice of the human capital variable (which was 
not the case in Knack and Keefer 1997). They also use an interaction term of trust 
and per capita GDP, which allows them to prove the existence of the low-trust 
poverty trap. Similarly to Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001) also 
analyses the determinants of trust, namely formal institutions and population 
heterogeneity. The most interesting results come from these investigations: much 
of the influence of formal institutions and population heterogeneity on growth 
occurs through their impact on trust. So, Zak and Knack (2001) are able to 
identify trust as a channel, and not only a factor on its own to induce growth. 
The paper by Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) explicitly and extensively 
analyses the robustness of the results on the relationship between trust and 
economic growth derived by the above-mentioned two seminal papers (Knack 
and Keefer 1997, and Zak and Knack 2001). They provide robustness analyses 
along four dimensions. First, they focus on the statistical significance of the trust 
variable.9 Second, they explore the robustness of the results on trust in terms of 
effect size. Thirdly, they analyse the sensitivity of results by using different 
proxies for the variables that are always included in a Barro-type growth 
regression (e.g., initial income, human capital). Fourth, they change the sample of 
countries.10 The results reveal that Zak and Knack (2001) are very robust along 
the first two dimensions, which is not the case for Knack and Keefer (1997) 
which is robust only to a very limitedly extent. Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) also 
shows that the improvement in robustness is due to the inclusion of countries with 
relatively low scores of trust; accordingly, as they conclude, the empirical 
literature on trust and growth is mainly plagued by data constrains rather than the 
biases resulting from omitted variables. 
Whiteley (2000) examines the relationship on a cross section of 34 
countries for the period between 1970 and 1992. To measure social capital, he 
uses an index of three indicators from the WVS. These are questions about 
trusting members of one's own family, trusting fellow citizens, and trusting 
people in general. He obtains very similar results to those of the above studies: 
social capital has a positive significant effect on economic growth, with a size 
                                                 
9 In these investigations they change the set of conditioning variables in the regressions. 
10 They start with the 29 countries of Knack and Keefer (1997), then gradually add the 12 countries 
with which Zak and Knack (2001) extends the analysis. 
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comparable to that of human capital and convergence. The results seem to be 
robust after various robustness checks are carried out. 
Following Putnam et al. (1993), a few studies have examined whether 
social capital is a prerequisite for prosperity at the sub-national level. Schneider et 
al. (2000) is one example. This paper analyses how political culture and social 
capital affects growth on a wider sample of the regions of Europe between 1980 
and 1996. To measure social capital the authors take data from Eurobarometer, 
and not the WVS. After running standard OLS regressions they find that strong 
doubts are raised regarding Putnam’s hypothesis: they argue that Putnam et al. 
(1993) overstate the effect of social capital on the growth of Italian regions; the 
impact of culture on economic growth is marginal, at best. Their results warn us 
that the relationship between social capital and growth may be conditional. 
Casey (2004) is the only study dealing with British regions. The author 
tries to comprise the “original” meaning of social capital by constructing an index 
from civic engagement, trust and associations based not only on WVS data, but 
British Social Attitudes data, as well. As a measure of economic performance, he 
uses a composite index, too. The statistical methods applied by Casey are not 
very sophisticated (including only correlations): the main finding is that the 
Putnam social capital index is robustly correlated with the economic performance 
index. Even the author admits that no causality is highlighted by his analysis and 
no economic policy can be based upon it. 
Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005a) is another paper looking at regional 
differences in Europe in the field of social capital-development. The main 
components of their social capital index are trust and civic engagement, the data 
for both are taken from European Values Studies for 1990, and by applying factor 
analysis one comprehensive measure is created for social capital. In their 
empirical investigations they relate this measure to economic development and 
regional economic growth in 54 western European regions in 7 countries. As a 
measure of economic performance, Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005a) calculate 
regional growth differentials by relating the regional GDP per capita to the 
country mean.11 They come to a very similar conclusion to that drawn by many 
others: after controlling for initial levels of GRP per capita, social capital is 
positively and significantly related to regional economic growth. 
With the intention of answering the question of whether the findings of 
Putnam et al. (1993) on Italian regions can be generalized, the two authors 
mentioned above refine their investigations in another paper (Beugelsdijk and 
Van Schaik 2005b). Instead of constructing a composite index for social capital, 
here they use separate measures for its two dimensions: generalized trust and 
associational activities. They also renew the regression analysis, by modifying 
the specification, but more importantly, by providing an extensive set of 
                                                 
11 As they argue, an advantage of using relative data versus non-relative data is the direct control for 
national growth rates that might bias regional growth rates. 
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robustness checks. As for the regression specification, they include additional 
control variables. What they find is to some extent different from their previous 
results, and from Knack and Keefer’s (1997): trust is not a significant determinant 
of regional growth, but active group membership12 is, a result that partly confirms 
Putnam et al.’s (1993) hypothesis. These results seem to be very robust after 
running 5 different types of robustness checks. 
Berggren et al. (2007) provides an extensive robustness analysis 
concerning the link between trust and growth, and discovers that this relationship 
is less robust than claimed by earlier studies. As one dimension of robustness 
checks, the authors look at whether the results are stable over time, by using data 
for the 1990s, as opposed to the time period involved in earlier studies (1970-
1992). Extreme bound analysis and robust regression methods, and the 
combination of the two are other types of robustness checks they apply. Their 
basic OLS results indicate the same positive and statistically significant 
relationship between trust and economic growth found in previous studies. But 
the robustness results point to four new facts: when removing four outliers, the 
estimated coefficient is almost halved; statistical significance at the 5 percent 
level is obtained at a much lower percentage than what has been found before; 
when conducting extreme bound analysis without outliers, the trust coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 10.1 percent of all regressions; the 
distribution of estimated trust coefficients is more widespread compared with the 
previously studied sample of countries. The authors conclude “even though trust 
may not be robustly related to growth, it could still be important to some degree – 
and at least as important as many other “classic” variables” (Berggren et al. 
2007:271). 
Akçomak and ter Weel (2009) is unique in the literature in the sense that 
it focuses on the indirect effects of social capital on economic growth. As a 
channel through which social capital induces growth rates, this paper identifies 
innovation. The theoretical framework is as follows: “A higher social capital 
stock, which is determined by historical institutions, increases the incidence of 
innovation. The reason for this is that investments in innovative activities are 
risky and capital providers want to receive commitment from researchers that 
their money is well spent. This is easier in an environment in which people trust 
each other. In turn, this increases income” (ibid p. 546). To test the above, 
Akçomak and ter Weel’s (2009) empirical strategy consists of three steps. First, 
they establish the causal relationship between social capital and growth, second, 
they examine the link between social capital and innovation, and third, they apply 
3SLS strategy. Throughout the empirical investigation trust is instrumented by 
historical institutions such as early literacy, past political institutions and 
universities. The data source for social capital is the European Social Surveys and 
the European Values Study Surveys, and for innovation it is Eurostat’s regional 
database. Akçomak and ter Weel’s (2009) results augment to a great extent those 
                                                 
12 Civic engagement, or in other words, associational activity, is divided into different categories, such 
as active and passive group membership (Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik 2005b). 
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of the cross sectional studies: for 102 regions in Europe, this paper provides 
evidence for the fact that innovation has a strong positive impact on growth, the 
former being significantly affected by social capital, but social capital does not 
have a significant effect on growth. In other words, unlike previous studies the 
estimations do not suggest a direct role for social capital, but an indirect one. 
These results are valid and robust. 
The only paper discovering a negative relationship between trust and 
growth is Roth (2009). The theoretical underpinning for a possible negative 
relationship between trust and growth is the collective action theory of Olson 
(1982), which emphasizes the possible negative effect of the accumulation of too 
many special interest groups hampering the efficient actions of the government. 
Roth (2009), as opposed to the above studies on the trust-growth relationship 
which rely on a cross sectional design, uses panel data and runs fixed-effects 
regressions for a 41-country sample over the period from 1980 to 2004 with a 
total of 129 observations. His major finding is that economic growth is negatively 
related to trust, which is mainly driven by certain countries that exhibit the 
highest negative relationship in the sample. Roth's further investigations also 
reveal that when excluding transition countries from the sample, the relationship 
becomes curvilinear, meaning that in low-trust countries an increase in trust leads 
to higher growth, but in high-trust countries an increase in trust leads to a 
decrease in growth. But, interestingly, if he analyses the relationship in a cross 
section of countries, the positive association of trust with growth detected my 
many, appears. Although Roth's (2009) results are statistically robust, and 
supported by Olson's (1982) theory, he warns that his results may suffer from 
omitted variable bias, or measurement errors or misspecification.13 
The research question of Ahlerup et al. (2009) is also unique in the social 
capital-growth literature because the authors’ primary interest lies in 
understanding whether social capital substitutes or complements formal 
institutions in economic growth. To derive hypotheses for the empirical analysis 
the authors develop a simple model of a sequential investment game between a 
lender and a producer in which both a formal institution (enforceability of 
contracts by courts) and trust is included. The model suggests that the effect of 
trust is nonlinear and depends on the quality of institutions. The results obtained 
from a standard cross-country Barro-type growth regression provide evidence that 
trust (measured by the usual WVS question data) and formal institutions 
(measured as the quality of the government14) substitute each other in growth: 
both trust and formal institutions have a positive and significant impact on 
growth, and their interaction term is also significant, but negative. In the 
                                                 
13 Helliwell (1996), to some extent, endorses Roth’s paper (2009) by pointing to a negative 
relationship between trust and economic performance. As a measure of economic performance he uses 
productivity growth. Clearly, this is the only cross-country study that finds negative link between trust 
and economic performance. 
14 Quality of the government is the average of ICRGs measures of corruption, law and order, 
bureaucracy quality. 
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interpretation of Ahlerup et al. (2009) this indicates that the marginal effect of 
social capital decreases with better institutions: trust matters the most when 
formal institutions are weak. On the other hand, the marginal effect of an 
improvement in institutions depends on the level of trust. Accordingly, the 
relationship between trust and institutions is mainly about substitution. 
 
4. THE RECENT LITERATURE 
Tabellini (2008, 2010) opens up a new branch in the analysis of the 
impact of culture on development by introducing and pioneering the use of a 
composite measure based on answers to four WVS questions, diverging in this 
way from the social capital concept. The variables he focuses on are trust, 
respect, individual self-control, and obedience.15 
In his 2010 paper (Tabellini 2010) he shows that the aggregate variable 
constructed from the four introduced above significantly correlates with current 
development in different regions of Europe, after controlling for country fixed 
effects and for school enrolment in 1960. He assumes that trust, respect and 
individual self-control serve as rules governing and stimulating interaction 
between individuals, whereas obedience is thought to limit economic interaction 
and development by decreasing risk-taking, which is important for 
entrepreneurship. He also uses an instrumental variable estimation because of his 
suspicion that the causal effect of culture is endogenous to economic 
development. His finding is that the data do not reject the hypothesis that the 
effect of the two historical variables (past literacy and past political institutions) 
on regional output only operates through culture. When it comes to the question 
of whether the effect of culture is direct or indirect, his results suggest that the 
effect of culture on output operates mainly or exclusively through the functioning 
of government institutions, at least within Italy. A plausible interpretation of the 
findings of this paper is that cultural differences are so important because they 
bring about a different functioning of the same formal institutions, and that 
culture is central to the mechanism through which past institutions influence the 
functioning of current institutions. 
The four measures suggested by Tabellini are extensively used by 
Williamson in several empirical studies. In her 2009 paper (Williamson 2009) she 
investigates the relationship between formal and informal institutions (culture) 
and how the interaction between the two can impact development. To measure 
formal institutions, she uses the political institutions of Glaeser et al. (2004) and 
develops an index for formal institutions by using the first principle component of 
four measures. In order to measure informal institutions (culture), she relies on 
Tabellini (2010). She develops a culture index based on the four variables 
described above. Then she calculates the difference between the formal and 
                                                 
15 As a kind of self-criticism, he acknowledges that the way in which he treats culture is largely a 
black box (Tabellini 2010:711). See also section 5. 
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informal (culture) indices with the aim of measuring the strength of formal 
institutions vis-à-vis the informal ones. Her results, in an important respect, are 
different from those of Tabellini because she identifies a dominant effect of 
informal institutions (culture): strong informal institutions are determinants of 
economic development regardless of the strength of the formal institutions. 
More recently, she and her co-author (Williamson and Mathers 2011) 
show that culture, and the economic institutions associated with economic 
freedom are both independently important for economic growth, where culture is 
measured by the above-mentioned culture index.16 They find that when 
controlling for both culture and economic freedom simultaneously, the strong 
association between culture and growth becomes much weaker, while, 
overwhelmingly, economic freedom retains a positive and highly significant 
relationship with economic growth. According to them, this suggests that culture 
and economic freedom may act as substitutes. To some extent this result conflicts 
with that of Williamson (2009) since here culture becomes less significant in the 
growth regression when certain institutions are in place. 
Mathers and Williamson (2011) is another paper which investigates how 
the interaction between culture and economic freedom affects economic 
prosperity. By including culture in the analysis the authors aim to provide a 
partial explanation for why the same institutions lead to different economic 
outcomes. They find that culture enhances the impact of economic freedom on 
growth by about 10 percentage points. Their results suggest that the same 
economic institutions combined with different cultures have diverse outcomes. 
Voigt and Park (2008), as proxies for values and norms (culture) use the 
GLOBE study on culture, leadership and organization, in which different values 
and norms reflect firm behaviour, in particular different leadership models. Voigt 
and Park’s (2008) hypothesis is that in the long-run there will be a close 
correspondence between culture (values and norms) and institutions, since those 
institutions which are incompatible with the prevalent values and norms are likely 
to disappear. They use a simultaneous equation approach and examine the 
influence of culture both directly and indirectly via institutions. As for the direct 
effect of culture, their results are rather mixed: when using the rule of law as a 
measure for institutions, culture does not have a significant effect beyond that of 
the rule of law; when using a measure of political institutions, some values have a 
significant effect. As for the indirect effect of culture, the results are not 
convincing either way. In sum, Voigt and Park (2008) find that some norms 
matter for economic development, but this impact greatly depends on the choice 
of institutional proxy. 
                                                 
16 Johnson and Lenartowicz (1998) is an early, but very preliminary, attempt to link culture to 
economic freedom, and accordingly, to economic development. The idea is that culture affects the 
extent to which countries are economically free. To express culture, this paper uses the data of both 
Hofstede and Schwartz. However, the empirical model is underspecified, the sample is very small (25 
countries) and there are no robustness checks. 
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Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010, 2011) analyse the effect of the three 
main measures of culture (the WVS, the Hofstede data and the Schwartz Values 
Survey) on output per capita. In the 2011 paper they find that the Hofstede’s 
individualism index is always significant, whereas this is not the case for most 
cultural variables. Among the Schwartz variables17, embeddedness is significant 
with a negative effect, and affective autonomy, intellectual autonomy, and 
egalitarianism are also jointly positively significant. 
In their more detailed analysis (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2010), they 
assume that culture plays a key role in stimulating innovations and hence 
explaining long-run economic growth. They hypothesize that culture is a basic 
force underlying formal institutions and long-run growth. They find that there is a 
two-way causality between culture and institutions, thus suggesting that 
institutions are in part determined by culture. They show empirically a strong 
causal effect from culture to long-run growth and the level of innovation. Their 
findings are consistent with the predictions of their theory, indicating that a more 
individualist culture should lead to more innovation and hence greater economic 
development. They clearly show that culture makes an important contribution to 
economic development which is independent of institutions. In terms of 
magnitudes, culture explains income differences across countries at least as much 
as institutions. 
Maseland’s (2013) focus is on explaining how culture affects 
institutions, and as a by-product, per capita GDP. Relying on a literature in 
biological psychology, he proposes using a new instrument for culture when 
regressing culture on institutions. This variable is the prevalence rate of 
Toxoplasma gondii18. It has been shown that infection with this parasite has an 
effect on individual personality: a stronger focus on competition and personal 
achievement, at the expense of concerns for others, and reduced 
conscientiousness, and morality (Flegr et al. 1996). These changes in personality 
make people more opportunistic and suspicious of the behaviour of others, and 
reduce the level of trust in society (Maseland 2013:115). As a measure for culture 
Maseland (2013) uses the first principle component of four measures (power 
distance, individualism/collectivism and uncertainty avoidance, from Hofstede 
(2001), and distrust (WVS)), and for institutional quality he used the first 
principal component of the Worldwide Governance Indicators’ sub-categories. 
By using the IV estimation strategy with Toxoplasma gondii as an instrument, his 
main finding is that culture exercises a significant effect both on institutions and 
per capita GDP. Its results are robust for a large set of control variables. 
 
 
                                                 
17 The Schwartz variables will be presented in detail in the next section. 
18 Toxoplasma gondii is a parasite commonly found in the intestines of cats and other felines which 
can cause latent infection among humans. Prevalence rates differ across countries. 
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5. CRITICISM OF THE LITERATURE 
The criticism vis-à-vis the empirical analysis of the impact of culture on 
growth is widespread, but three main debatable issues emerge in particular. First 
of all, the empirical studies lack of clear conceptualization and a well-developed 
theoretical framework. Second, the measurement of culture can be criticized on 
many grounds. Third, a number of difficulties can be associated with the 
econometrics used in the literature. In relation to the above three issues, several 
critical arguments are put forward, the majority of which concern the literature on 
trust, which is the most developed in the field, as can be seen from the above 
review. 
On the theoretical side, some of the most prominent scholars in the field 
draw attention to the vague concept of culture19: according to Tabellini (2010), 
culture is a “black box”, which is an impediment to the further development of 
research in the field. The above review also shows that every time scholars refer 
to culture they simply reduce its meaning to a much narrower concept, such as 
trust or church attendance, and many others; and depending on which particular 
meaning is used, the empirical results may be different. This may suggest that 
culture must be regarded as a multidimensional concept (e.g., Klasing 2013, 
Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik 2005b, Bjornskov 2006). Here one can agree with 
Herrmann-Pillath (2014) who argues that the econometrics of culture simply 
shows that there is an impact of something on economic performance, but we do 
not know what it is exactly. 
The main line of the criticism concerning the measurement is that it 
lacks any theoretical framework. According to Beugelsdijk (2006), the major 
problem regarding the culture (social capital)-growth literature is the mismatch 
between the theoretical foundations of culture and its empirical 
operationalization: the conceptualization is at the micro level, referring to micro 
units such as individuals (or firms), but in the empirical investigations culture is 
used as an aggregate macro variable, as with the growth rate or investment 
variables. Furthermore, Beugelsdijk (2006) thinks that “we do not measure what 
we think we measure” (ibid p. 373), i.e., the WVS trust question is a bad 
measure.20 To provide evidence for this opinion, he shows that in the sample of 
Zak and Knack (2001) the WVS trust question correlates highly with the good 
functioning of formal institutions; accordingly, trust is just an element in a 
broader measure of institutions. Not only the WVS, but the Hofstede dataset is 
criticized, too, for measuring culture in a rather ad hoc or pragmatic way: 
Schwartz (1994, 2006) argues that Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions of culture lack 
                                                 
19 As Moore (1999:75) puts it: “We are trying to do empirical research on a fragile conceptual base. 
The concept of trust remains elusive, and useful empirical measures still evade us.” 
20 For instance Glaeser et al. (2000) finds that a survey question about trust predicts trustworthiness 
much better than it does trusting behavior. Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011), and Miller and 
Mitamura (2003) point out that the WVS trust question is ambiguous: it is not clear what “generally 
speaking” means (see footnote 7). As a consequence, there may be doubts as to whether it really 
measures generalized trust among those who do not know each other. 
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any a priori theorizing about culture, and he proposes a theory-driven measure 
for culture (more details in the next section).  
As for the econometric problems, many (e.g., Durlauf 2002, Durlauf and 
Fafchamps 2005, Beugelsdijk et al. 2004, Beugelsdijk 2006) illustrate the basic 
econometric difficulties with the culture (social capital) literature: robustness 
(sensitivity) and endogeneity. Both issues were to some extent discussed in the 
above review. For instance Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) and Berggren et al. (2007) 
provide robustness checks and report that the results of previous studies are less 
robust than claimed. When it comes to IV strategy in the empirical investigations, 
the list of instruments is quite wide-ranging. While instrumental variables used in 
the most recent studies are more convincing about their exogeneity, the 
instruments of earlier studies may be weak instruments (Fehr 2009) because it is 
quite easy to find arguments supporting their direct effect on growth. 
Bearing in mind these three critical issues in the field, what suggestions 
could be made to ensure further progress? First of all, one needs theory-based 
testable hypotheses when analysing the role of culture (Guiso et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, since culture has several dimensions (e.g., Klasing 2013) the effects 
of various cultural dimensions must be analysed separately from one another to 
see the potentially different effects produced. That is, one needs to evaluate the 
impact of each particular cultural phenomenon rather than evaluating the impact 
of their “aggregate” (Tambovtsev 2015). To sum up, researchers in the field 
should move towards testing theory-based hypotheses about the impact of a 
particular cultural dimension or component on economic performance and 
highlight the mechanism of this impact. 
In line with the above arguments, Manski (2000) clearly states the two 
possible paths for further development: (1) empirical researchers need to be much 
clearer on the questions they address21, and (2) empirical studies need to be based 
on better data, if possible on experiments. The first route means that we need to 
move from an analysis of generalities to that of specific relationships, since it will 
facilitate more precise and comprehensive modelling of causal mechanisms. The 
second route involves trying to find the kind of cultural data that is based on some 
a priori theorizing about the effects and, accordingly, captures a well-defined 
dimension of culture. 
 
6. HOW SHOULD WE MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS? 
The two routes emerging from the above critiques are quite clear, but the 
question which remains is what concrete steps could be taken. In what follows we 
                                                 
21 Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005:1689) argue in the same way: “empirical analyses need to step back 
from grandiose approaches to social capital and focus on the more mundane but potentially far more 
fruitful task of analyzing specific social components to individual behavior”. 
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will make suggestions regarding both routes that might help advance future 
research in the field. 
Bearing in mind the multidimensional character of the culture as 
proposed by several scholars, my argument is that Boettke et al.’s (2008) theory 
of institutional stickiness can be a useful theoretical framework for “unbundling” 
culture. Similarly to the way in which these authors categorize different 
institutions on the basis of their degree of stickiness, we propose to distinguish 
various layers of culture based on their stickiness. Deeply embedded cultural 
values are the core to which other cultural layers and institutions stick. 
Furthermore, particular cultural layers differ in terms of the extent of their 
stickiness. Consequently, what I argue is that instead of dealing exclusively with 
the “aggregate” culture, it is worth differentiating various layers of the culture, 
based on their stickiness, and one has to analyse their effects separately. 
We have good reasons to assume that particular cultural layers exercise 
different effects on economic development; accordingly, empirical investigations 
on particular layers will be concerned with much more specific questions than the 
rather “grandiose” ones which feature in the current literature. Of course, here 
there is no space to develop the layer model of culture; only various preliminary 
ideas can be discussed. First, I must emphasize that the variables used in the 
literature can belong to different cultural layers. The deepest layer, i.e., the core 
to which other layers are stuck, is those individual values that serve as guidelines 
for individuals’ actions, and basically cannot change. Trust, in Tabellini’s sense, 
belongs to another layer, since trust is not exogenous in economic growth, but 
rather endogenous, and depends upon individuals’ circumstances, and can change 
if these circumstances change. As a third layer we would mention various 
attitudes or religiosity that can change relatively frequently, and are less sticky. 
The second route proposed above is related to the measurement of 
culture: measurement should be based on theoretical grounds. Since, as argued 
above, culture is a multidimensional concept, its measurement should relate to the 
measurement of a particular layer. International survey-databases are hard to 
develop and scholars are reluctant to initiate them. So we would not argue that 
such databases would be needed; instead, I intend to draw the attention to an 
already existing database that has not (yet) been widely used by researchers. This 
database is the Schwartz Values Survey, which has been built since 1988 by 
Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz 1994, 1999, 2006), and, importantly, on theoretical 
foundations. 
The theory behind the database has been developed in cross-cultural 
psychology, and centres on individual values. Based on a clear and unambiguous 
definition22, Schwartz sees values as the core of culture which are exogenous to 
individuals and do not change. The survey questions and the variables derived 
                                                 
22 Values are the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, and norms that that guide 
people in their actions. 
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from them rely on a priori theorizing, rather than ad hoc examination of data. The 
starting point for Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2006) is that all societies confront three 
basic issues when forming the social relations, and the answers to these questions 
are inherently different in different societies. Schwartz identifies 7 values, 
forming an integrated system. To measure them, the database contains 56 abstract 
items that have reasonably equivalent meanings in each country. To sum up, the 
Schwartz Values Survey provides “better” data than the WVS or Hofstede, so 
future research should rely on it to a greater extent, especially when it comes to 
an analysis of the deepest cultural layer. 
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KAKO KULTURNE VRIJEDNOSTI UTJEČU NA 
EKONOMSKI RAST: KRITIČKI PREGLED 
LITERATURE 
 
Sažetak 
U posljednje vrijeme svjedočimo naglom porastu znanstveno-istraživačke 
literature koja proučava utjecaj kulture na ekonomski razvoj. Ovo područje 
istraživanja nastavlja se razvijati na granici teorije rasta i institucionalne 
ekonomije. Ovaj rad sažima i daje detaljan kritički pregled ove literature. 
Slijedeći dva glavna pravca koja preporučuju kritičari, autor predlaže mogući 
pravac za daljnji napredak u ovom području.  
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